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Macroeconomic and monetary policy rely heavily on the assumption of price rigidity in
the short run. In the literature there is broad consensus on the existence of such rigidities,
but their origins remain to be fully understood. Our thesis contributes to this field of
research, examining the pricing behavior of multiproduct firms in Norwegian product
markets.
Using a relatively unexplored dataset on Norwegian PPI data, we provide evidence on
price rigidity at the producer level. We document that firm behavior to a certain extent
depend on the number of products produced by a firm, a finding that is not accounted for
in traditional macroeconomic models. Furthermore, we employ a multinomial logit model
to examine synchronization of price changes, both within-firm and within-industry. We
find strong evidence of within-firm synchronization. This synchronization is independent
of the direction of the price changes, supporting the theory of economies of scope in menu
costs. Moreover, we find some evidence of within-industry synchronization of price changes,
indicating the presence of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions at the industry
level. However, the industry synchronization effects are found to be small, suggesting
that producers have a degree of pricing power, as they appear to be able to disregard
competitor behavior to a certain extent. These findings shed light on the competitive
environment in Norwegian product markets. Combined with earlier literature they have
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and purpose
Macroeconomic and monetary policy rely heavily on the assumption of price rigidity in
the short run. If the money supply increases, production and employment is stimulated
through increasing real money balances, which yields short-run monetary non-neutrality
(Taylor, 1999). The assumption of price rigidity can be traced to David Hume more than
200 years back, and the aggregate empirical evidence on the existence of price rigidity is
solid. However, research also show that the pricing behavior of firms is highly heterogeneous
(Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008), and the mechanisms behind this heterogeneity, as well
as its implications for price rigidity, remain to be fully understood.
With data accessibility and quality continuously evolving, substantial research have been
conducted into the pricing behavior of firms the last decades. Among the questions
typically asked in the literature is by how much are prices typically changed; how often
they are changed; and whether firms exhibit synchronization trends, both within the
firm and within industries. The main theoretical framework for explaining within-firm
synchronization is economies of scope in price changes, while cross-firm synchronization
can be theoretically explained by strategic complementarities and strategic interaction
(Bhattarai and Schoenle, 2014). Our paper contributes to this field of research with a
focus on within-firm and within-industry synchronization of price changes.
As argued by Vermeulen et al. (2012), the producer prices are the prices that are
ultimately modelled in macroeconomic models. When practicing inflation targeting
it is crucial to know how shocks to production costs are transmitted to consumer prices
(Cornille and Dossche, 2008), as stabilizing consumer prices is the ultimate goal of such
stabilization policies. Detailed knowledge of the microeconomic transmission mechanisms,
from monetary and aggregate shocks to consumer and producer prices, is thus a highly
relevant and active field of research. Such research is relevant for central banks modeling
the macroeconomic responses as well as regulators seeking to understand competitive
dynamics.
2 1.1 Motivation and purpose
Traditional macroeconomic models generally assume producers to be single-product firms
and could therefore be less suited to analyze price dynamics of an economy in which multi-
product firms are largely prevalent (Bonomo et al., 2020). With data becoming richer and
more available, empirical research on multi-product firms has flourished since the early
2000s; the prevalence of menu costs, scope economies in price changes, and a high degree
of within-firm synchronization has been documented in a number of countries (Alvarez
and Lippi, 2014; Bhattarai and Schoenle, 2014; Letterie and Nilsen, 2020). Letterie and
Nilsen (2020) argue that within-firm synchronization of price changes increases the rigidity
of individual product prices compared to the single-product models, as pricing decisions
also depend on the benefits of changing the price of other products.
While Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) find evidence of a high degree of within-firm
synchronization, increasing with the number of products, they also consider synchronization
at the industry level. They find industry synchronization of price changes to be prevalent,
but less so than at the firm level. Furthermore, they find that price change synchronization
at the industry level seems to be declining as the number of products in a given firm
increases. This extension is motivated by Bhaskar (2002), arguing that industry-level
synchronization is more likely within product groups with high elasticity of substitution.
Bhaskar argues that this substitutability leads to rich patterns of strategic interaction,
and that it can generate stable staggering of prices. The basic, intuitive argument of this
result is the point that strategic complementarities should be stronger within industries
than across industries.
Using a rich and relatively unexplored dataset on Norwegian PPI data, exploring the
extent of this strategic interaction will be the aim of this paper. To what degree do we
observe firm behavior changing with the number of products produced by the firm, and
do we find evidence of within-firm synchronization of price changes? Can the dataset be
disaggregated to competitive product markets where the products are relevant substitutes?
Do we observe synchronization in these disaggregated markets? The rich dataset allows
us to investigate strategic interactions and industry synchronization at a high level of
detail. Answers to these questions could help in creating a broad fundament for producer
price modeling when paired with previous research on the field.
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1.2 Research question
More specifically, the research question we seek to answer is the following:
"Do actors in related and competing product markets appear to synchronize their price
changes? What are the magnitudes of within-firm and within-industry synchronization of
price changes? How do these measures relate to the number of products produced by the
manufacturer?"
Within-firm synchronization has been extensively researched (see e.g. Lach and Tsiddon,
1996; Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez and Lippi, 2014; Letterie and Nilsen, 2020), while
synchronization of price changes across competing products has been less so. Here,
we can compare our results to those of Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) using US PPI
data, and Dedola et al. (2019) using Danish PPI data. Overall, it is highly interesting
to compare our results to international research into pricing behavior, with the aim to
thereafter discuss the implications of our findings regarding price stickiness and monetary
policy. Considering the relative magnitudes of the effects we find, we also reflect on which
theoretical frameworks seem the most relevant in explaining the observed pricing behavior.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is organized in the following way. In chapter 2 we review the research literature
on pricing behavior and price stickiness. The aim of the chapter is to familiarize the reader
with the relevant concepts and theories applied throughout the analysis. The chapter
initially provides a broad overview of research into pricing behavior, and how the research
is categorized. The following subsections, section 2.1-2.3, outline the relevant theoretical
baseline for the analysis.
In chapter 3 we present the data used in the analysis. We first explain the structure and
characteristics of the dataset. The chapter also provides an overview of the adjustments
made to the dataset, and how the data are merged across years. In chapter 4 we present
the methodology applied in our analysis, emphasizing the formulas, assumptions, and
reasoning for the choice of methods.
4 1.3 Outline
Throughout chapter 5, we present our main findings. The chapter starts off by presenting
summary statistics and an overview of price change frequencies, the size and the dispersion
of price changes. We then present our industry categorization, and a number of measures
across these industries. The final part of the analysis concerns multiproduct behavior
and price change synchronization, where we quantify and discuss within-firm and within-
industry synchronization of price changes, as well as how this behavior changes with the
number of products manufactured by the firm.
In chapter 6 we summarize our main findings, and discuss their implications and relevance.
5
2 Literature Review
Understanding pricing behavior is important for a range of issues in macroeconomics, such
as the welfare consequences of business cycles and optimal monetary policy (Nakamura
and Steinsson, 2008). The rationale for empirical research into pricing behavior is pointed
out by Alvarez et al. (2006): "A better empirical understanding of individual price-setting
is crucial for building macroeconomic models of inflation with adequate microeconomic
foundations that may help in the design of monetary policy".
Among the pioneers of empirical research on pricing behavior was Cecchetti (1986), who
found substantial price stickiness in US magazine prices, and strong empirical support for
sticky price models based on monopolistic competition. Carlton (1986) found significant
rigidities, but also a great deal of heterogeneity with regards to price durations as well as
the size of changes on products used in manufacturing. These early contributions were
important in laying the foundations of research on pricing behavior. Data have become
richer and more accessible in recent years (Klenow and Malin, 2010), and the earlier
literature has thus been revived using new and broader evidence, starting with Bils and
Klenow (2004).
The literature on price change behavior is typically divided into two main categories;
state dependent and time dependent models (Alvarez et al., 2017). Sheshinski and Weiss
(1977) develop a model based on the assumption that there are real costs associated with
the price-change process, in which firms fix the nominal price over constant intervals.
Thus, the real price fluctuates over the fixed period. Their paper, describing how pricing
decisions are related to inflation rates and other relevant states of the economy, has
been developed into several state dependent model classes: Menu cost models (Golosov
and Lucas, 2007; Alvarez and Lippi, 2014), convex cost models (Rotemberg, 1982), and
consumer anger models (Zbaracki et al., 2004; Rotemberg, 2005).
Regarding time dependency, Calvo (1983) presents a model in which firms change price
upon receiving a random signal (shock). The signal is stochastic and independent across
firms and geometrically distributed over the time span. The Calvo model assumes a
constant hazard rate, in which the hazard rate is defined as the probability of a price
change. This assumption has been extensively crosschecked, with Nakamura and Steinsson
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(2008) finding that the hazard rate seems to be downward sloping for the first few months
following a price change, and then flat.
Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) research the pricing behavior of multiproduct firms, by
first examining how the aggregate behavior changes with the number of products, and
then focusing on synchronization behavior both within-firm and -industry. They find
multiproduct firms to conduct significantly more frequent and small price changes. Further,
they provide evidence of synchronization of price changes both within-firm and within-
industry. Their results indicate that industry synchronization is decreasing with the
number of goods produced by the firm, while within-firm price change synchronization
seems to increase with the number of goods produced internally.
In a similar study to Bhattarai and Schoenle’s, Dedola et al. (2019) find the frequency and
size of price changes in Denmark to be broadly unrelated to the number of products within-
firm. Regarding synchronization, they find within-firm synchronization to increase and
within-industry synchronization to decrease with the number of manufactured products.
Considering multiproduct firms, Letterie and Nilsen (2020) find many infrequent and
small price changes as well as a high degree of within-firm synchronization. Their model
provides evidence of scope economies in price changes, linear and convex adjustment costs,
as well as evidence on the presence of firm-specific shocks.
To the best of our knowledge, relatively few empirical research papers have been published
considering within-industry price change synchronization. However, as most published
research points out, pricing behavior is highly heterogenous across firms and industries.
According to Fabiani et al. (2005), stemming from a survey of firms, coordination failure
(competitor behavior) is among the most important factors in explaining firm’s pricing
behavior, ranking behind implicit contracts, explicit contracts, and cost-based pricing.
2.1 Price rigidity: Background and empirical evidence
In the long run, the amount of money in circulation does not affect anything real, such as
how much people work or their consumption (Lucas, 1996). This concept, called neutrality
of money, implies that central banks should not seek to impact long-run production
and activity levels in the economy as this will create economic imbalances. However,
economists have for long assumed wages and prices to be rather rigid in the short run,
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implying a tradeoff between employment (output) and inflation and thus making room for
stabilization policy (Romer, 2012). This relationship was shown by Phillips (1958) to be
strong and stable, and the relationship became known as the Phillips curve. The Phillips
curve implies that you can hold the economy at a growth beyond the "equilibrium level"
simply by accepting higher inflation.
The belief in this stable long-run tradeoff shattered through the 1960s, with Friedman
(1968) arguing that the Phillips curve fails to distinguish between nominal and real
variables. If output, or employment, was kept above its long-run equilibrium at a "cost"
of higher inflation, price setters and employees would eventually adjust their demands and
expectations upward, weakening or even abolishing the tradeoff. Since then the Phillips
curve has been revised to be consistent with such rational expectations, to what is called
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). The NKPC is now a dominant approach to
macroeconomic modeling (Alvarez, 2008).
Besides the magnitude of work seeking to model and explain pricing behavior, several
papers of a more descriptive nature on pricing behavior have been published the last
decades. Vermeulen et al. (2012) sum up the findings from European markets, based
on individual papers from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. On
average, they find that 21% of producer prices tend to change each month, with substantial
heterogeneity. They also find the price changes to oftentimes be large relative to the
inflation rate, indicating the presence of a selection effect.1
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) do similar work on US data. They find a median price
change frequency for finished-goods of 10.8%, with the 55th percentile being a frequency
of 18.7%. The reasoning for this result lies in the substantial heterogeneity; most product
categories with price change frequency above the median have a frequency substantially
above 10.8%. Having presented these results, they conclude that finished-goods exhibit
substantial price rigidity in the US.
The abovementioned statistics all indicate some degree of price rigidity in European and
US producer prices. Though several models and explanations have been proposed toward
explaining where the rigidity stems from, no collective agreement on the microeconomic
1
Selection effect: As suggested by Caplin and Spulber (1987), firms choose to change the prices that
are the furthest from the optimal price level when hit by a monetary shock
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foundations has been reached. While Nilsen et al. (2018) find evidence of time dependency,
menu costs and shocks related to state dependency does also seem to play a role in
explaining price rigidity (Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez and Lippi, 2014).
2.2 State dependent models
State-dependent models assume rigidity in pricing behavior to originate from economic
conditions. In these models firms have the ability to change their prices at any point
in time, but face some sort of adjustment costs to do so. This causes price rigidity, as
profit-maximizing firms consider this cost when setting prices (Romer, 2012). These
adjustment costs are typically modelled either as convex costs or as “menu costs” (Blinder
et al., 1998). In the models of convex costs adjustment costs are assumed to follow a
convex function of the size of the price change. Thus, large price changes induce higher
marginal adjustment costs. Rotemberg (1982) argue that such costs cause gradual price
adjustment increasing the price rigidity. In the presence of convex adjustment costs we
would expect to see a pattern of small and frequent price changes as large price changes
would be penalized. To explain the presence of large price changes in the data, Nilsen
and Vange (2019) propose a model combining the concept of convex adjustment costs
with menu costs. This is consistent with the findings of Zbaracki et al. (2004) who find
components of managerial and consumer costs to be convex, while physical costs are not.
Moreover, they find the physical costs to be small compared to other components.
The concept of menu costs was first considered theoretically by Sheshinski and Weiss
(1977). They propose that firms face a fixed cost of changing prices, independent of the
size of the price change. Opposed with such costs the optimal pricing strategy would be
to follow an (S,s) rule keeping the nominal price constant until the real price reaches a
threshold s. As a result of this pricing strategy we would expect to see a price pattern
with periods of inaction followed by relatively large price changes. The costs inducing this
pattern has later been referred to as “menu costs” referring to the physical cost restaurants
face when printing new menus. The term does not only cover the physical cost of changing
prices, but also managerial and customer related costs associated with price changes
(Zbaracki et al., 2004).
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A shortcoming of the classical menu cost model is that it fails to explain small price
changes (Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008). To explain this Dotsey et al. (1999) introduce
a stochastic menu cost model where the size of the adjustment costs are distributed
independently across time and firms. This allows for small price changes as some firms
face low adjustment costs reducing the adjustment threshold s. A similar approach is
taken by Burstein (2006) studying the adjustment cost of pricing plans. Golosov and
Lucas (2007) argue that these models do not allow for sufficient heterogeneity in terminal
prices and propose an alternative model calibrated with micro price data. Inspired by
Caplin and Spulber (1987) they suggest that firms choose to change the prices that are
the furthest from the optimal price level when hit by a monetary shock. This selection
effect reduces the price rigidity implying a high degree of monetary neutrality.
Newer literature on menu costs has focused on the multiproduct aspect of pricing behavior
(Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez and Lippi, 2014; Bhattarai and Schoenle, 2014; Yang, 2019;
Bonomo et al., 2020; Stella, 2020; Letterie and Nilsen, 2020). Lach and Tsiddon (1996)
argue that multiproduct firms face economics of scope in menu costs as the marginal
adjustment cost will fall if the firm decide to change more than one price. Midrigan (2011)
illustrates this using the traditional restaurant example; if a single item on the menu needs
repricing the restaurant will have to pay the cost of printing new menus. Conditional on
paying this cost repricing other items on the menu will be costless. This can explain why
we often observe small price changes in data, an observation that as mentioned contradicts
the predictions of classical menu cost models (Lach and Tsiddon, 2007).
An implication of economies of scope in menu costs is that we would expect to see within-
firm synchronization of price changes. Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) find that when the
price of one good in a firm changes there is a large increase in the probability that the price
of other goods within the same firm change in the same direction. This synchronization is
found to be stronger than the within-industry synchronization supporting the theory of
economics of scope in menu costs. Dedola et al. (2019) support the findings of within-firm
synchronization. They also find the probability of a negative price change to increase if
other prices in the firm are changed upward. In other words, they find the probability of
holding the price constant to be decreasing, while the probability of both upward and
downward changes increase, supporting the theory of economics of scope in menu costs.
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2.3 Strategic complementarity and synchronization
The concept of strategic complements and substitutes was first introduced by Bulow et al.
(1985) to describe observed strategic interactions in oligopoly theory. Broadly they define
two actions to be strategic complements (substitutes) if an increase in the action of one
agent increases (decreases) the optimal action of the other agent. In terms of pricing
decisions this means that if two goods are strategic complements it will be optimal to
increase (decrease) the price of a good if the prices of other competing goods rise (fall).
The early literature on strategic complementarity in pricing was linked to the concept of
coordination failure (Ball and Romer, 1991). Cooper and John (1988) derived an abstract
game to prove how strategic complementarity can lead to multiple equilibria and a serve
as multiplier of the effect of changes in exogenous variables. The different equilibria have
corresponding welfare levels, and Cooper and John argue that strategic complementarity
can explain how an economy might end up in a suboptimal low-activity equilibrium, as
the actors in the economy fail to coordinate their actions.
The model derived by Cooper and John only contains real variables and thus their paper
does not consider monetary non-neutralities. Ball and Romer (1990) argue that nominal
rigidities causing monetary non-neutrality can be explained by a combination of real
rigidities and frictions in nominal adjustment. In Ball and Romer (1991) they further
develop this theory and show that strategic complementarity as a source of real rigidity,
combined with menu costs causing nominal frictions, lead to multiple equilibria in the
degree of rigidity. They propose that if firm i exhibit menu costs the price rigidity of firm
j will increase as their optimal pricing strategy depend on the strategy of firm i. Thus,
the presence of strategic complementarity amplifies the real effects of nominal frictions.
Synchronization of pricing decisions as a result of strategic complementarity may arise at
different levels in the economy. Carvalho (2006) show how heterogeneity in price stickiness
and strategic complementarities impact the rigidity of the aggregate price level as sectors
with frequent price changes are influenced by slower adjusting sectors and vice versa.
This relationship is found to be asymmetric as the slow adjusting sectors seem to have a
disproportionate effect on the aggregate price level in the economy.
Bhaskar (2002) finds that strategic complementarities are stronger within an industry than
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at the aggregate level. He argues that the elasticity of substitution is greater for products
within an industry than across industries, implying a higher degree of synchronization
within industries. This is in line with the findings of Blinder et al. (1998) who find that
competitive pressure and the desire to maintain or increase market shares are some of the
main reasons why firms hesitate to raise prices when demand rises.
Despite the findings of synchronization researchers have questioned the magnitude of
the amplification of nominal rigidities. Klenow and Willis (2016) find that a model with
demand side strategic complementarity requires implausibly large idiosyncratic shocks to
match micro level price changes. Burstein and Hellwig (2007) introduce a menu cost model
with pricing complementarities calibrated with product level price data and market shares.
They find that the complementarities are too weak to generate real effects. Nakamura
and Steinsson (2010) suggest that the effect of strategic complementarity depends on if it
stems from nonisoelastic demand and fixed factors of production, or real wage rigidity
and sticky intermediate inputs. They find that strategic complementarity caused by the
later mechanisms do not require unrealistically large menu costs or idiosyncratic shocks




The empirical analysis in this thesis is conducted combining two data sources, both
supplied by Statistics Norway (henceforth SSB). The price data, with monthly records,
is used to develop statistics such as the Norwegian producer price index (PPI) and the
price index for first-time domestic sales (PIF) (SSB, 2020). These data are merged
with structural data on the firms, with yearly records. The structural data allow us to
investigate and control for attributes such as firm size (number of employees) and cost
(wage) shocks in our analyses.
3.1 The pricing dataset
The overall pricing dataset consists of about 630 disctinct product groups, for which
monthly prices are collected and divided into the subcategories domestic, import and
export prices.2 The pricing dataset applied in our analysis covers the years 2005-2016. The
producer price index (PPI), developed on the grounds of this pricing data, is published
monthly (SSB, 2020). Products registered in the dataset are subject to continuous
revisions, implying that the price history will be of varying length across products.
As the main purpose of this paper is to consider pricing behavior within firms and
industries, we do not consider the prices of import and export products. These prices are
likely to be set considering different criterion than the domestic products, and analyzing
them gives exposure to noise such as exchange rate movement (Letterie and Nilsen, 2020).
Furthermore, export prices are irrelevant as they do not represent prices on products sold
on the Norwegian market. Import prices could be relevant, but the exposure to exchange
rate movement makes analyzing the data less desirable.
SSB applies several control mechanisms in the collection procedure: Large price changes
relative to the last reported price are flagged; the collection schemes are manually
controlled for administrative characteristics; product groups are randomly controlled
to avoid reporting errors. In the case of non-reported prices in the monthly collection,
follow-up is prioritized toward products that have a large influence on the aggregate levels
2
Product groups defined by SSB, based on CPA (statistical classification of products by activity)
classifications.
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(SSB, 2020). The overall implication is that the data quality should be high and thus
relevant to our micro-level research on producer pricing behavior.
3.2 Data categorization and aggregation levels
The dataset contains several identificators that are used to distinguish the observations.
Each record in the base dataset contains an enterprise and a firm identificator. These
identificators are relevant to separate different producers’ price observations on comparable
products. Furthermore, to distinguish the products, the dataset provides two product
identificators; the statistical classification of products by activity (CPA) and the
harmonized system (HS). In our analysis these product identificators are used to classify
different industries.
3.2.1 Defining firms and enterprises
The distinction between an enterprise and a firm is rather formal. An enterprise is the
legal, "top-level" entity that is required to report accounting on a regular basis. The
enterprise, or group, oftentimes owns many firms. Rather simplistically, we refer to a
firm as the entity producing related products and making day-to-day decisions on their
product sortiment. The enterprise will typically have the power to overrule their firm’s
decisions. However, in the daily operations, it seems appropriate to assume that most
decisions are conducted at the firm level. This reasoning also implies that the firm is the
entity you will usually deal with in person. Furthermore, earlier work on Norwegian PPI
data have mainly considered firm behavior. Thus, we conduct our analyses at the firm
level.
3.2.2 Choice of product classification system
The statistical classification of products by activity (CPA) system is EU’s standard for
products grouped after industry, while the harmonized system (HS) is an international
customs and statistical nomenclature (SSB, 2020). Both systems are specified to six digits
internationally, while the harmonized system has additional national codes at the seven
and eight digit level. The logic of the two classification systems is similar, with the first
two digits defining the broad category, and the next four more closely specifying the given
14 3.2 Data categorization and aggregation levels
product (Eurostat, 2008; Norwegian Toll Customs, 2020).
In choosing between the two classification systems, a few observations are relevant. Firstly,
as apparent from the name, the CPA is centered around activity type more so than a single
end product. Being a customs nomenclature, the HS codes are more product centered.
This is desirable for our analysis. Furthermore, the CPA code for what otherwise seems
to be the same product, with constant or similar price, is at times changing from year to
year. If a price change analysis is based on a code that changes from year to year, the
product will be registered as a new product after the change, which is undesirable. This
phenomenon is more prevalent in the CPA code system, although there are classification
changes in the HS codes as well. Overall, the HS codes are the preferred classification
system for our analysis. We refer to table 3.1 below for an overview of the system’s
structure.
Table 3.1: Illustrating example of the structure of the HS codes
HS-code Name Name Name
Section I Live animals; animal products
04 Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; honey; edible products of animal origin
04.06 Cheese and curd
04.06.10 Fresh (unripened or uncured) cheese
04.06.10.01 Whey cheese
04.06.10.09 Other
04.06.20 Grated or powdered cheese, of all kinds
04.06.30 Processed cheese, not grated or powdered
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3.3 The firm structure dataset
Related to the pricing dataset, data on firm structure is also provided by SSB. These
data cover all Norwegian firms, not only those represented in the price data. The data
are provided with yearly records. The structure dataset contains enterprise and firm
identificators equal to those in the pricing dataset, allowing us to match each firm in
the pricing data with detailed firm structure data. Among other things, the structure
data provide records on the number of employees, net revenues, hours worked, and wage
bills. Furthermore, the dataset contains complete records of the relationship between the
top-level enterprises and their subordinate firms. This information is used to 1) control for
cost (wage) growth with regards to the pricing behavior, and 2) assess the generalizability
of our data, comparing the firms represented in the pricing data to the average Norwegian
firm.
From table A1.2 in the appendix we can see that the firms represented in the price data
tend to have more employees than the average Norwegian firm. In addition, the firms
are part of enterprises that are rather large. These findings are consistent across most
industries in the dataset.
3.4 Merging and adjustments to the final dataset
3.4.1 Merging the pricing dataset
The datasets provided by SSB consist of separate data files for the respective years 2005-
2016. Although significant portions of the products are observed across many years, we
need to identify the products uniquely in order to analyze the pricing behavior over time.
Although the HS codes are designed to identify and distinguish product categories, they
do not identify products that are similar but still unequal within a given firm. Thus, the
pricing data is matched across years using a short number, unique to each product within
a firm. The final matching of price observations over time is thus conducted matching the
products on the firm identificators, the HS code, and the short number.
As elaborated earlier, the HS codes are changing less than the CPA codes. Matching the
price observations using HS codes is therefore the most precise method, and the CPA
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codes are excluded from our merged dataset. However, we still experience some breaks in
product time series stemming from a change in HS code. These observations are still kept
in the dataset, as they can be analyzed as new products. We do, however, lose duration
on the pricing time series of these observations as a break in HS code leads to the product
being defined as a new product.
3.4.2 Adjustments and final dataset
Some records in the data are incomplete. For instance, we have 334 observations without
enterprise and firm identificators. These observations are dropped. Furthermore, 6241
observations have the HS-code "99999999", which represents the category "undefined".
Also these observations are dropped, as the pricing behavior on these products cannot
be interpreted meaningfully. About 7% of the prices are imputed by SSB as they are
non-reported. This may lead to misinterpretation as the prices set by the firm are not
necessarily observable to SSB. Thus, such instances are corrected by setting the imputed
prices equal to the reported price at time t  1 following earlier work on the same data.
Next, the dataset has some observations with large price changes. We define large changes
as price changes outside the interval [-0.49, 0,99].3 If prices are reduced by more than
49%, or increased by more than 99%, they are likely related to a change of quality or even
representing a new product. As such changes are unlikely to be normal price changes, 296
observations with large positive changes and 327 observations with large negative changes
are dropped.
Finally, we exclude the SIC sectors representing mining and quarrying, water supply and
sewage, and wholesale and retail.4 These sectors are of little relevance when analyzing
producer pricing behavior. In addition, mining and quarrying industries are known to
have an abnormally high adjustment frequencies (Nilsen and Vange, 2019).
The final pricing dataset contains 208 391 price observations on 2880 products, distributed
across 516 firms. For more details on the distribution of these observations across product
categories, see table A3.1 in the appendix.
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4.1 The frequency of price changes
Price adjustment behavior may be assessed on the intensive margin, focusing on the size
of price changes, or on the extensive margin, assessing the discrete choice of changing
prices or not. When calculating the price change frequency and synchronization behavior
we consider price changes on the extensive margin. A consequence of this is that all price
changes, independent of size, will be weighted equally when calculating the frequency.
Following the definitions of Baudry et al. (2004) our dataset consist of several sequences
of price quotes, Pijk,t, indicating the price of product i produced by firm j in industry k
at time t. A sequence of unchanged price quotes is called a price spell, and a sequence
of successive price spells is called a trajectory. Price spells and trajectories can be either
censored or uncensored depending on the available data. A censored price spell is one
without an observed start or ending point while uncensored ones have a defined start- and
end-periods.
4.1.1 The frequency approach
The frequency of price changes can be found using two different methodological approaches:
the frequency approach and the duration approach. As indicated by their names the
frequency approach is based on the frequency of price changes as a share of price quotations
in a given period while the duration approach computes the frequency as the inverse of the
duration of the spells. The two methods give the same results as long as the data contain
only uncensored price spells. This is because censored price spells must be excluded from
the frequency calculation using the duration approach as they have unknown durations
(Veronese et al., 2005). Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004) argue that excluding censored price
spells might cause a selection bias as long price spells are more likely to be censored. As
our data contain a relatively large proportion of censored price spells we use the frequency
approach in our analysis. Using the frequency approach, the price change frequency can
be calculated in the following steps:
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First we define an indicator variable, Iijk,t, indicating whether there has been a change in





1 if Pijk,t 6= Pijk,t 1, and Pijk,t and Pijk,t 1 are both observed
0 otherwise
(4.1)
The sum of this variable,
PT
t=1 Iijk,t , gives the total number of price changes for product
ijk.





1 if Pijk,t and Pijk,t 1 are both observed
0 if Pijk,t is observed, but not Pijk,t 1
(4.2)
Jijk,t indicates if the price of product ijk has been observed for two successive months. The
sum of this variable,
PT
t=1 Jijk,t, will give the number of price quotes used in calculating
the price change frequency of product ijk. As it is not possible to determine whether the
first price in a trajectory is a result of a price change or not it will not be used in the
calculation of the price change frequency, thus Jijk,t will be zero if a given price quote is
the first one in a trajectory.
The price change frequency of a given product can be found using the defined indicator
variables as the frequency, Fijk, is given by the number of price changes as a share of the






4.2 Where are pricing decisions made?
One important consideration for our analyses is where pricing decisions are made. Our
dataset contains identificators of enterprises as well as firms, and pricing decisions should
be attributed to one of the entities. We argue that, in the case of an enterprise owning
multiple firms, day-to-day operating decisions like a price change is likely to be made by
the firm. Typically, the enterprise is a governing body with auditory requirements, and
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the corporate management team and boards is situated in the enterprise part of larger
organizations (Jones, 2013). We argue that the pricing decisions are likely to be delegated
to the firm level in most cases, although it should be clear that "where pricing decisions
are made" has no single answer.
Our final dataset contains a yearly average of 339 enterprises and 361 firms. Thus, the
reality of the pricing dataset in isolation is that there is a 1-to-1 relationship between most
firms and their associated enterprises in the price data. Thus, our results would at most
change marginally depending on which entity is used in our analyses. However, the pricing
dataset does not cover the full range of Norwegian ownership structures. Crosschecking
the structure dataset, we find that many enterprises covered in the pricing dataset in
reality have several underlying firms, although they on average only are represented by
one or a few firms as shown in table A1.2.
4.3 Multiproduct aspect
To assess whether the pricing behavior changes with the number of products within a
firm, we follow a procedure similar to Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014), Dedola et al. (2019),
Letterie and Nilsen (2020) and a master thesis on multiproduct behavior by Leinum and
Riise (2016). The idea is to group the firms into bins in which the behavior is likely to be
similar. The bins are used in several parts of the empirical analysis; initially, we investigate
how price change frequency and other descriptive measures on pricing behavior change
over bins. Then, the bins are used to assess whether price change synchronization, both
within-firm and within-industry, changes with the number of products the firm produces.
4.3.1 Computing multiproduct bins
The first stage of making the bins is to compute the average number of products firm j
has across the time periods the firm is represented in the dataset (Zj). As the average is
computed over periods in which a firm is represented in the data, the average will never
be below 1. The result is in most cases a decimal number. This calculation is then used
to group the firms into the following bins;





1  3 if 1  Zj < 3
3  5 if 3  Zj < 5
5  7 if 5  Zj < 7
> 7 if Zj   7
(4.4)
To maximize comparability to the aforementioned studies using similar PPI datasets, we
have chosen bin sizes similar to these papers. We have investigated whether the results
change when defining the bins differently, either through making larger or smaller bins.
The results do not differ much qualitatively, although the exact point estimates differ.
Prioritizing comparability, we use the bin definitions of previous papers.
4.3.2 Computing bin-level statistics
Using bins, we present estimates of how the price change frequency and the size of price
changes relates to the number of products within firms. Calculating such measures is
done in three steps, following the procedure of Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014). First, we
calculate the measures at the product level. Thus, we first calculate a product specific
price change frequency, or the absolute percentage value of each price-change on a product.
Next, we find the median of these measures across the products within a firm. The final
step is to calculate the average of these numbers within the bins the firms are grouped in.
4.3.3 A note on product sortiments
A potential problem with the binning procedure may arise if the number of products
within a firm varied widely across periods. The consequence would be that some firms
could be grouped into the wrong bins for large periods of the analysis. For instance, a
firm could have an average of 3.1 products, and thus being grouped into the bin "3-5". In
reality this firm could have 2 products for most of the timespan, and then 7 products for
a short period of time. However, we argue that this problem is minimal:
Firstly, we refer to the sampling procedure of SSB. The procedure revolves around selecting
relevant and representative products for a given category, and then following the specific
products over extended periods. The product sample is only revised yearly by SSB,
implying that random noise and large changes in product sortiment are rare happenings.
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We have also investigated the development in products per period within-firm more
formally. Having generated a variable counting the observed number of products within
firm j and industry k in period t (Zjk,t), we can investigate the typical change in the size








The mean change in product sortiment is -0.0004, with a standard deviation of .32. Only
0.7% of the observations include a change in product sortiment outside the [-1, 1] interval,
while close to 2% of the observations have a change in product sortiment of exactly +/-
1 product. Thus, our conclusion is that the binning procedure yields the correct bin in
most periods for all firms. Furthermore, mistakes can be assumed to be averaged out, as
changes in product sortiment in the dataset occurs randomly across firms.
4.4 Price change synchronization
4.4.1 Measuring price change synchronization
To measure the degree of synchronization within-industry and within-firm, we employ a
method similar to Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014), Dedola et al. (2019) and Letterie and
Nilsen (2020). The aim is to quantify to which degree price changes on other products
within the firm, or within the industry, have an effect on the probability of a price
change. To estimate the degree of within-firm synchronization, we calculate the fraction of
products within the firm that change price upwards (downwards), excluding the product
we are trying to explain. To do this we first define two binary variables, Uijk,t and Dijk,t,
indicating whether a price change is positive or negative, where Iijk,t is the previously
defined variable indicating a price change.












1 if Pijk,t < Pijk,t 1 and Iijk,t =1
0 otherwise
(4.7)
The fraction of within-firm positive and negative price changes (UFijk,t and DFijk,t) is
then given by the sum of these variables over the sum of price observations for firm j at



















k=1 Zjk,t   1
(4.9)
The intuition behind using such fractions is the following: "If a firm changes 20% of its
other product prices in a given period, does this impact the probability of changing the
price on this product, and if so - by how much?". By excluding the product we are trying
to explain from the fraction calculations, we avoid issues of simultaneity bias between the
independent and dependent variables.5
4.4.2 Measuring industry synchronization
We calculate similar fraction measures to those within-firm to capture industry
synchronization. In many cases, a single firm has multiple products in the same industry,
whether we define the industry at the 4 digit or 6 digit HS level. For more depth on this
issue, we refer to table A2.1 in the appendix. For instance, several industries on the HS4
level have 3 products, of which 2 are produced by the same firm.
When calculating the fraction of price changes within the industry, we must first decide
what to do with competing products within a firm. Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) do
not specify how they handle such internal but seemingly competing products. If we
5
See Wooldridge (2016), p. 538. for a detailed explanation of the concept simultaneity bias
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assume that price changes within an industry are largely driven by industry specific
shocks and competitive forces, we argue that including products that are sold by the same
firm would be correct. Furthermore, by excluding all within-firm price changes from the
industry fractions, we implicitly make the stance that within-firm synchronization is more
important, and that two price changes from the same firm cannot stem from forces in the
industry. This is a clear drawback.
Keeping all changes within-firm in the industry fractions, the aim is to capture price
change synchronization between related and/or competing products. However, including
within-firm price changes in the industry price-change fractions does have drawbacks as
well. There is a correlation between the within-industry and within-firm fractions as
several industries only contain a single firm, as shown in figure A2.1. This could potentially
cause a problem of multicollinearity, leading to lower precision and larger standard errors
of the estimated coefficients. However, it does not lead to biased estimates (Wooldridge,
2016).
Our preferred measure of industry synchronization is the fraction of changes within the
industry not correcting for whether competing products are produced by the same firm.
This has the advantage of not attributing all price changes within the firm to within-firm
price change synchronization. These fractions are also in line with the work of Dedola
et al. (2019). The within-industry fractions are calculated summing the number of upward
and downward changes over all products (i) and firms (j) for each industry in a given





j=1 Uijk,t   Uijk,tPJ







j=1 Zjk,t   1
(4.11)
4.4.3 Level of industry aggregation
To measure industry synchronization we first have to define what we consider an industry.
In the industrial organization literature there is no single definition of a market or an
industry (Tirole, 1988). Robinson (1933) suggest that you can define a market by starting
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with one good and look at the substitutes of this good. Then, you find the substitutes
of the substitutes and continue until you find a gap in the chain of substitutes. Another
approach is to use prices to define industries. Goods in an industry are likely to be hit
by the same supply and demand shocks. Thus, we expect the prices of goods within an
industry to correlate (Tirole, 1988). Tirole also points out that an industry should not be
defined too narrowly, as that would lead to few substitutes; nor should it be defined too
broadly, as the markets defined should allow a single description of the main interactions
among firms.
On the two digit level each HS code represent a broad variety of products, e.g. 04 "dairy
products" and 70 "glass and glassware". Even though one could argue that there is
some level of substitutability between products within these categories we find them too
broad; dairy products include subcategories ranging from milk, to cheese, to natural honey.
Thus, we prefer disaggregating further, as the strategic complementarities are likely to be
stronger at a more disaggregated level.
In a paper aiming to estimate the effects of monetary policy on pricing behavior Balleer
and Zorn (2019) control for industries at the 4-digit level using Elementary Price Indices
(EPIs) for all major industrial products. The EPI classification system is specified to 9
digits, but the German statistical bureau (FSO) only provides statistics at the 4-digit
level for data disclosure reasons. Balleer and Zorn provide an example of the 4-digit level
categorization as "Processed and Preserved Potatoes". This is highly comparable to the
aggregation in the HS codes, where 07.01 represents "Potatoes, fresh or chilled".
Furthermore, Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) measure within-industry synchronization
using NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) codes at the 6-digit level.
The NAICS is activity based, with the 6-digit level representing for instance 111211
"Potato Farming" or 311421 "Fruit and Vegetable Canning" (NAICS, 2020). In light
of the arguments made by Bhaskar (2002) that price synchronization is more probable
between products of high substitutability, we argue that the HS codes are advantageous
to the NAICS codes used by Bhattarai and Schoenle. This because we believe the HS
codes represent more closely defined product groups than an activity based system such
as NAICS.
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To estimate industry synchronization we need at least two products within an industry.
From figure 4.1 we can see that, on all aggregation levels, a substantial part of the unique
HS-codes only have one product in our sample. This fraction is largest at the HS6 level
where 47% of the HS codes on average have one single product. At the 4-digit HS level,
67% of the observed products have relevant competing products6, which yields substantial
amounts of data for the measurements. Additionally, we are aiming for comparability to
Bhattarai and Schoenle’s study. Bearing in mind that Balleer and Zorn (2019) employed
4-digit EPI product categorizations and that these codes are relatively comparable to the
4-digit HS codes, the 4-digit level is the aggregation level applied throughout our analysis.
Figure 4.1: Number of products per HS code
Note: The mean number of products per HS code is calculated by first finding the distinct number of products with a given
HS code in a given year. The yearly numbers are used to find a mean number of products represented in each code. This
mean is then rounded to the closest integer. Furthermore, we find the number of HS codes with on average one product
represented in the sample etc. This number is divided by the total number of distinct HS codes in our dataset to find the
share of HS codes with a given number of products.
6
Although 67% of the products have competitors, parts of these are within-firm. Looking at appendix
A2.1, we see that 39% of the HS codes involves multiple firms at the HS4 level
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4.4.4 The multinomial logistic model
To measure the degree of synchronization of price changes we want to see how the
probability of changing the price of a product varies with the fraction of price changes
of other products within the same product category, or other products within the firm.
In every period the firms can choose between three mutually exclusive actions; increase
prices, decrease prices or keep them unchanged. These kind of categorical responses can
be modeled using a set of multinomial models.
If the categories can be ranked one could use ordered logit or probit models. In our
case the categories could be said to be ranked as keeping prices unchanged rank below
increasing prices and above decreasing prices. A key assumption of these ordered models
is the proportional odds assumption stating that the relationship between each pair of
outcome groups is the same, giving one set of model coefficients. In our case this would
mean that if a one unit increase in the fraction of industry price changes increase the odds
of a positive price change by X relative to the other categories, it would also increase the
odds of a positive price change or keeping the price constant relative to a negative price
change by X. As emphasized by Ball and Mankiw (1994) firms tend to behave differently
when increasing and decreasing prices. Thus the proportional odds assumption is not
likely to hold in our case and we will proceed with an unordered model.
The most frequently used unordered model is the multinomial logit model (Long and
Freese, 2006). The model uses the logistic distribution to model the probability of an
outcome as a function of the independent variables. It can be explained using a latent
variable model. A continuous latent variable pitj⇤ can be expressed as:
pijk,tc⇤ =  cxijk,t =  c1UIijk,t+ c2DIijk,t+⇢c1UFijk,t+⇢c2DFijk,t+ czijk,t+ ✏ijk,t (4.12)
UI and DI give the fractions of positive and negative price changes in the industry and
are included to estimate the within-industry synchronization of price changes. UF and
DF give the fractions of price changes of other products produced by the same firm to
estimate the within-firm synchronization. We have also included a set of control variables
to control for exogenous shocks, represented by vector z. These include yearly and monthly
dummies to control for seasonal and yearly effects, and the sector specific PPI to control
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for aggregate shocks to the industries. We also include wage per worker, logarithmically
transformed, to control for cost shocks. Conditional on these variables the observed price





 1 if  1 < pijk,tc⇤ < ⌧1
0 if ⌧1 < pijk,tc⇤ < ⌧2
1 if ⌧2 < pijk,tc⇤ < 1
(4.13)
The parameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation. As explained by













Where I(pijk,t = c) is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the observed pricing
decision equals c and 0 otherwise. The probability of a given outcome c = { 1, 0, 1} can
then be expressed as:




4.4.5 Interpreting the model coefficients
The output of a multinomial logit regression gives coefficients of the outcomes relative
to a selected base outcome. The estimated parameters can be interpreted as the change
in log odds of the outcome relative to the base outcome. This interpretation has limited
practical applicability and the results of multinomial logistic regressions are therefore
usually reported in terms of odds ratios, predicted probabilities or as the marginal effects
of a change in an independent variable on the probability of a given outcome (Long, 1997).




Research on pricing behavior is important to optimize monetary policy as well as to
understand the welfare consequences of business cycles (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).
As our dataset is rather large, covering 12 years of producer pricing, it is well-equipped to
shed new light on behavioral tendencies and price change synchronization within firms
and industries.
5.1 Aggregate summary statistics
In our data we find a mean price change frequency of 24.7%. The median price change
frequency is found to be 9.4%. This points to the heterogeneity in the data; large shares
of the dataset have infrequent price changes, while those who change price more often
have a very high price change frequency. For instance, the 90th-percentile of products
have a price change frequency of 85.7%.
Among other aggregate statistics, the absolute percentage size of price changes has a
mean (median) size of 5.0% (2.5%). The median size of upward changes is 2.7%, while the
median downward change is -2.3%. These numbers are in line those of Vermeulen et al.
(2012), who present statistics for several European countries. They find a median price
increase of 3% and a median decrease of 2%. The distribution of the size of price changes
is visualized in figure 5.1 on the next page. The figure indicates that price changes outside
the [-10%, 10%] interval are rather rare. We can also see that a large majority of the price
changes are in the interval [-2.5%, 2.5%]. Contrasting this to the theory of menu costs,
one could thus argue that the selection effect seems to be of low importance, as there is
little evidence of large price adjustments being the norm.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of price changes
Note: The figure gives the distribution of the price changes observed in the dataset as the percentage change from one period
to the next. The horizontal axis gives the percentage price change and the vertical axis gives the fraction of observations
within a given interval of percentage price changes. The outlined bar gives the fraction of zero-changes, meaning the
fraction of price quotes in the dataset where the price does not change from one period to the next.The gray bars give the
distribution of the percentage change of the price changes excluding these zero-changes. Price changes outside the [-30%,
30%] interval (in total 0.4% of the observations) are excluded from the figure.
Further, as is to be expected in an inflationary environment, more price changes are
positive than negative: 59.9% of the observed price changes in the sample are upward
changes. This can be compared to the average for the Euro area, which exhibits an average
price change frequency of 21% of which 12% are upward changes, implying that 57% of the
price changes are upward (Vermeulen et al., 2012). The time span covered by Vermeulen
et al. goes from mid-to-late 1990s until mid 2000s, and the average PPI inflation hovers
around 2%.7 This implies that the data is highly comparable to the Norwegian dataset as
the average yearly PPI inflation in Norway from 2005 to 2016 was 2.1% (SSB, 2020).
The data also points to clear seasonality trends, with substantial excess price change
frequency each January. The mean price change frequency in January is 34.9%, while the
7
Both the mean PPI inflation for the Euro area, and the PPI inflation for each country represented
in the data, is depicted graphically in Vermeulen et al. (2012) figure 3. In an earlier working paper they
give the exact averages to be 1.0% in Germany, 0.7% in France, 1.5% in Italy, 2.1% in Spain, 1.5% in
Belgium and 1.7% in Portugal (Vermeulen et al., 2007)
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lowest mean frequency appears in December, with 20.1%. Only February appears to be
even close to the excess frequency in January, having a mean frequency of 32.1%. This
points to large shares of price changes appearing early in the year. The seasonality of price
changes is visualized in figure 5.2 below. The figure clearly underlines the importance of
controlling for seasonality in our multinomial logit models.
Figure 5.2: Price change frequency, 2005-2016
Note: Monthly frequency of price changes from January 2005 to December 2016. The frequency is calculated as the number
of price changes within a given month divided by the number observations in that month. If the price quote is the first one
in a spell it is not included in the denominator as there is not possible to tell whether there has been a change in the price
or not.
5.2 Pricing behavior across product groups
As can be seen from Norwegian Toll Customs (2020), the HS codes are divided into 20
product sections. Table 5.1 presents the mean and median price change frequency across
these product sections, and the share of price observations the section has in the dataset.
The table indicates that there is substantial heterogeneity across product groups. This is
in line with the findings of previous research on pricing behavior (e.g. Vermeulen et al.,
2012; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Nilsen et al., 2018).
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Table 5.1: Mean and median frequency over HS sections
Section Price change frequency Share ofdatasetMean Median
1 Meat 41.2 29.4 4.1
2 Vegetables 20.3 10.5 1.2
3 Fats and oils 33.0 11.9 0.5
4 Prepared foodstuffs 34.5 16.1 16.8
5 Minerals 26.9 10.2 1.6
6 Chemicals 25.3 7.6 9.2
7 Plastic articles 28.2 8.4 5.7
8 Skin and leather articles 6.4 3.5 0.8
9 Wood articles 34.6 15.8 8.7
10 Paper 29.2 12.9 3.1
11 Textiles 12.2 6.3 4.6
12 Other personal apparel 2.3 0.0 0.1
13 Stone and glass 22.0 8.4 6.2
14 Precious metals 15.5 8.4 0.9
15 Metallic products 22.6 7.4 10.8
16 Machines 12.2 7.0 15.2
17 Vehicles 11.5 10.9 2.0
18 Measuring instruments 17.2 6.3 2.4
20 Misc. articles 24.7 9.1 6.1
Note: All numbers are in percentages. Price change frequencies are first calculated on the product level as the number of
price changes over the number of observations for a given product. Section mean and median gives the mean and median
frequencies of the products within a section. Section names are abbreviated. Full names can be found in appendix A1.1.
Further descriptive statistics on section level can be found in appendix A3.1.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the food-related sections 1-4 are exhibiting rather high
price change frequency. However, all prepared food products belong to section 4 (prepared
foodstuffs). Processed meat products such as sausages or beefs belong to section 4; section
1 (meat) typically represents intermediate goods not yet fully processed for consumption.
Vermeulen et al. (2012) report that processed food has an average price change frequency
across Europe of 27%. In all countries reported except for Belgium, processed food exhibits
significantly higher price change frequency than the average across the whole sample. Our
findings are in line with these numbers, although the estimated frequency is somewhat
higher.
Having an overview of the pricing behavior across product groups, we turn to considering
the differences in behavior. Figure 5.3 plots the kernel density distribution of the share of
price changes per year. Products with one price change a year have a share of 1/12 =
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0.083. Thus, the figure indicates that there is a large group of products with one to two
price changes a year, and a second group of products with highly frequent price changes.
Figure 5.3: Kernel density distribution; share of price changes per year
Note: For each product the number of price changes in a given year is divided by the number of price observations. The
kernel density plot gives the distribution of this yearly share of price changes. We use the share of price changes rather
than the number of price changes as some products are included for less than 12 months in a given year.
Motivated by the density plot, we have grouped the HS 4-digit product groups into the
behavioral categories "frequent" and "infrequent" price changes. If a HS 4-digit product
group has an average share of price changes below 0.09 per year, i.e. slightly above
one change per year, it is defined to be a group with "infrequent" price changes. This
categorizes 31% of the distinct products as infrequent price changers, and 69% as frequent
changers. As the products are grouped according to the mean share of changes in their
HS 4-digit code, some products will have behavior different to their peers. Details on the
grouping is shown in the appendix, figure A3.1.
Figure 5.4 indicates that both the frequent and infrequent groups have excess price change
frequency in January and February. The price change frequency in January relative to
the frequency in the remaining months is clearly larger in the infrequent group, as could
be expained by the presence of explicit contracts with a one-year duration (Alvarez et
al., 2006). As discussed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), there also appear to be
some degree of quarterly excess price change frequency, with April, July and October
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exhibiting somewhat higher price change frequency than their nearby months. Although
the frequency of price changes seems somewhat more evenly distributed in the product
groups categorized as frequent changers, also this group exhibits excess frequency early
on in the year.
Figure 5.4: Monthly price change frequency
Note: Monthly price change frequencies are given as the number of price changes in a given month divided by the number
of observations in that month.
5.3 Multiproduct behavior
Across the whole sample, the dataset includes 516 distinct firms and 2880 products. The
average numbers per year are 361 firms and 1469 products. The mean (median) number
of products per firm is 3.71 (3). Thus, it is clear that multiproduct firms are largely
prevalent in the economy. We group all firms in the dataset into bins depending on the
average number of products they are represented with per period. The bins are outlined
in table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics by multiproduct bins
Number of products
1-3 3-5 5-7 >7
Number of firms 280 116 68 52
Number of products 636 721 629 894
Share of dataset 21.1% 25.2% 22.9% 30.8%
Mean number of products 1.8 4.2 6.2 10.3
Standard error of mean 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
Std. Dev. number of products 0.8 0.6 0.5 3.6
25% percentile 1.0 3.8 5.9 7.8
Median 1.9 4.0 6.0 9.4
75% percentile 2.7 4.8 6.7 10.9
Minimum number of products 1 3.0 5.1 7.2
Maximum number of products 3.0 5.0 7.0 25.4
Mean employment 99.9 85.0 88.6 156.5
Median employment 49.3 52.9 56.8 74.8
Mean empoyment per product 69.4 20.9 14.6 15.2
Note: All firms are classified based on the mean number of products over the periods the firm is represented in the dataset.
The number of firms and products gives the total number of firms and products in a bin over the total sample period. Bin
level descriptive statistics on the number of products are calculated based on the mean number of products of the firms in
a given bin. To find the mean and median employment we first find the mean number of employees in each firm. The mean
and median are calculated by taking the mean and median of this mean value across all firms in a bin. Mean employment
per product is found by dividing the mean employment by the mean number of products in each firm.
We see that the largest fraction of price observations stem from firms grouped in the >7
bin. These firms are rather large relative to the average Norwegian firm, having a mean
(median) of 156.5 (74.8) employees. There are rather few firms in the larger bins, but as
they have more products, they account for large shares of our observations. In terms of
number of firms, most firms belong to bin 1-3. It should also be noted that the firms in
bin 1-3 are not necessarily small; they might just be represented with fewer products in
the sample on average. Firms in bin 1-3 have a median employment quite close to those
in bins 3-5 and 5-7, while their mean employment is actually above bins 3-5 and 5-7. This
indicates that there are some relatively large firms grouped into bin 1-3.
5.3.1 The frequency of price changes
A natural point of departure is to investigate how the price change frequency changes
with bins. Lach and Tsiddon (1996) argue that firms face economies of scope in menu
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costs, meaning that changing price on multiple products is costless once paying the cost
of changing the price of one products. Thus, the intuition would be that the price change
frequency should increase with the number of products.
Figure 5.5: Mean price change frequency over bins
Note: To find the mean price change frequency in each bin we first calculate the product level frequencies. Next, we find
the median frequency across all products in each firm. The bin level mean frequency is given by the average of these median
frequencies. The dashed lines represent the 95% CI. They are given by +/- 1.96 times the standard error across firms.
The middle line represents the estimated price change frequency in the respective bins,
and the dashed lines represent the confidence interval, calculated as +/- 1.96 times the
standard error of the mean frequencies across firms. We see that the calculated frequency
starts somewhat high, before falling as the number of products increase, then increasing
going from bin 5-7 to >7. This result is close to that of Leinum and Riise (2016), who
did a similar analysis for the years 2005-2009. However, as indicated from the figure, the
trend is not significant. Thus, we do not find any evidence of the frequency increasing
with the number of products. This is quite different to Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014),
who find a significant increase in frequency as the number of products increase. On the
contrary, our results are in line with Dedola et al. (2019), who write that "the frequency
of price changes is broadly independent of the number of goods per firm" analyzing Danish
PPI data.
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5.3.2 The size of price changes
As elaborated earlier, the aggregate mean (median) absolute percentage size of price
changes is 5.0% (2.5%). If economies of scope in menu costs are relevant in explaining
pricing behavior, we would expect firms with multiple products to have smaller price
changes, as even small price changes can be beneficial when the adjustment costs are
shared between several products.
Figure 5.6: Mean absolute size of changes over bins
Note: To find the mean absolute size of price changes in each bin we first calculate the mean absolute size of price changes
at the product level. Next, we find the median absolute size across all products in each firm. The bin level mean is given
by the average of these median absolute sizes. The dashed lines represent the 95% CI. They are given by +/- 1.96 times
the standard error across firms.
From figure 5.6, we see that the absolute size of price changes seem to be somewhat
declining with the number of products within firms.8 However, the differences does not
appear to be significant, except for the difference between bins 1-3 and >7. The trend
is similar to the one found by Leinum and Riise (2016), but their analysis found no
significant differences. Although our results point in the same direction as Bhattarai and
Schoenle (2014), their results differ as they find a significant difference between all bins.
Furthermore, their mean absolute size of price change are significantly higher, with bin
1-3 having a mean absolute size of 8.50%, falling to a mean of 6.6% in bin >7. Thus, some
of the differences in results are likely to stem from differences in the underlying data, with
8
Figure 5.6 plots the mean absolute size of changes. For details on the mean size of positive and
negative changes separately we refer to figure A3.2 in the appendix
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our dataset having a lot of changes in the interval [-2.5%, 2.5%]. The mean absolute size
of changes is about half the size of Bhattarai and Schoenle’s results for the US.
5.3.3 The fraction of small changes
In relation to the mean absolute size of changes, a relevant statistic is the fraction of small
changes. A change is classified as small if it is smaller than 0.5 times the mean absolute
percentage size of price changes within the firm, following Midrigan (2011).
Figure 5.7: Mean fraction of small price changes
Note: We define a small change as a change that is smaller than 0.5 times the firm level mean absolute percentage change.
To find fraction of small price changes in each bin we first calculate the fraction of small price changes in each firm. The
bin level mean is given by the average of the firm level fractions. The dashed lines represent the 95% CI. They are given
by +/- 1.96 times the standard error across firms.
Figure 5.7 indicates that the fraction of small changes increases in the number of products,
with bin >7 having the largest fraction of small changes, with 49%. Furthermore, the
confidence intervals indicate that firms in bin >7 have significantly more small changes
than all other bins. Although the exact values of our fractions differ somewhat from those
calculated by Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014), this result points in the same direction as
their estimates. Their estimates indicate that the fraction of small changes in bin 1-3 is
38%, while bin 7 has a fractiton of small changes at 55%; our results indicate a range
from 41% in bin 1-3 to 49% in bin >7.
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5.3.4 Discussion of results: Multiproduct behavior
In the presence of scope economies in menu costs, one would expect the price change
frequency and the fraction of small changes to increase, and the mean size of changes to
decrease with the number of products within-firm. Similarly to Leinum and Riise (2016)
using a comparable dataset over the years 2005-2009, we find the expected results except
for when considering the price change frequency. Firms producing >7 products appear to
have a significantly larger fraction of small changes than all other bins, and a significantly
smaller mean size of changes than firms producing 1-3 products. Also Letterie and Nilsen
(2020) do not find the price change frequency to be increasing in the number of products
within-firm.
Our results place themselves somewhere inbetween the papers of Bhattarai and Schoenle
(2014) and Dedola et al. (2019). While the former find systematic differences across bins,
the latter find no clear evidence of such differences. One possible explanation of the
different results may be varying data collection procedures in the retrieval of PPI data.
Perhaps one of the procedures more correctly indicate the actual number of products
of a firm. However, this cannot be crosschecked without access to the data sources and
collection procedures used in the mentioned papers.
One potential problem may arise if there are systematic differences in the firm structure
and product offerings across bins. For instance, as shown in table 5.2, we see that firms
in bin 1-3 have a relatively high mean employment; especially on a per-product basis. If
this indicates that the typical products in bin 1-3 are different from products in the other
bins, this might explain why the firms in bin 1-3 appear to have the highest price change
frequency. Assessing this further, we have examined the distribution of observations to the
HS sections within the bins compared to the overall shares of the aggregate dataset. The
table can be found in appendix table A3.3. It indicates that firms in bin 1-3 are slightly
overrepresented in meat, paper, and metallic products. The clearest difference between the
bins is in prepared foodstuffs. Here, bin 7 has a substantial overrepresentation compared
to all other bins. However, we verify that our results are robust to these differences,
as indicated by appendix table A3.4. Regressing the calculated measures on indicator
variables for the different bins, controlling for HS 2-digit product groups and the number
of employees, we find no significant differences in the price change frequency across bins.
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Producers in bin 7 have a significantly smaller mean size of changes than bin 1-3, and
they have a significantly larger fraction of small changes than both bin 1-3 and 3-5.
5.4 Descriptive evidence of industry synchronization
One way to look into pricing behavior within product groups could be to examine whether
the pricing behavior changes with the number of products in a group. However, SSB’s
data collection process is centered around collecting the most relevant prices on different
products, which we argue is unlikely to average out to the true number of products in a
product market. Furthermore, this bias is more likely to occur in the markets with many
products with small market shares. Thus, we avoid examining the relationship between
pricing behavior and the number of products in an industry, as this cannot be inferred
from our data.
Instead, we consider the fraction of changes on other products within an industry when
there has been a price change on product i. Figure 5.8 shows how this fraction varies in
the months leading up to, and lagging, a price change on product i at time t.
Figure 5.8: Fraction of price-changes within-industry: Leads and lags
Note: The figure gives the mean fraction of within industry price changes leading up to and after a price change at time t.
To find the mean fractions we first find the fractions of price changes in the industry of product i leading up to and lagging
each observed price change of product i. Next, we find the mean of these fractions for all price changes in the dataset. The
mean is also found conditional on whether the price change is in a frequently or infrequently changing industry.
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The figure indicates that changes tend to coincide to a certain extent. The fraction of
changes on other products increases by 9.8 percentage points in a month where product
i has a price change considering the full dataset; for frequently changing products, the
fraction increases by 7.6 percentage points; and for infrequently changing products the
increase is 38.2 percentage points. Large parts of this tendency can likely be explained
by seasonality and aggregate shocks, which is addressed in the multinomial logit model.
Especially in the infrequently changing group there seem to be a clear tendency of
coinciding price changes. The effects of this graph that cannot be explained by our
remaining control variables are likely to be related to industry price synchronization
behavior.
Furthermore, the descriptive evidence provides no basis to assume a leading or lagging
relationship; there seem to be no tendency of excess share of changes on other products in
the months prior or following a price change on product i.
5.5 The multinomial logit model
To investigate price change synchronization we apply a multinomial logit model with three
discrete outcomes; negative change, no change, and positive change. The main results of
interest are the marginal effects on the probability of these outcomes with regards to an
increasing fraction of upward and downward changes within-firm and within-industry. As
control variables, we include 2-digit SIC sectoral monthly PPI to control for exogenous
shocks at the sector level. To control for cost shocks within the firms, we include the
logarithmically transformed wage per employee, which is accounted for on a yearly basis.
This is included as it is assumed that large shocks to costs (wages) are likely to induce
a price change. Finally, we control for yearly and monthly effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level to mitigate potential problems related to products within a
firm.
Marginal effects for all explanatory variables can be found in appendix table A3.5 and
A3.6.
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5.5.1 Marginal effects, frequent and infrequent product groups
Our categorization of HS 4-digit product groups defines a group as "infrequent" if prices
change on average less than 1.1 times per 12 months. Product groups with a higher share
of changes than this are defined as "frequent". Such a categorization defines 31% of our
observations as "infrequent" changers, and 69% as "frequent" changers.
As we suspect the infrequently changing products to be under long term contracts with
yearly durations, they might bias our estimates of within-industry synchronization. The
high price change frequency in January is likely to stem from renegotiation of contracts
rather than synchronization due to strategic complementarity. For this reason we have run
our regression model on our total dataset as well as the subset of products with frequent
price changes.
To make our results comparable to previous research we report the marginal effects in terms
of a one percentage point as well as a half standard deviation increase in the explanatory
variables. The marginal effects can be interpreted as following: A one percentage point
(1/2 standard deviation) increase in the fraction of positive price changes in the industry
increase the probability of a positive price change by 0.06 (0.66) percentage points when
we consider all products in the dataset, all else equal.9 Details on the marginal effects are
presented in table 5.3 on the next page.
9
The size of the standard deviations of the fractions can be found in appendix table A3.9
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Table 5.3: Marginal effects overview and by behavior










Fraction up industry 0.06*** 0.05* 0.66*** 0.56*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.25)
Fraction down industry -0.02 -0.05* -0.15 -0.48*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.18) (0.23)
Fraction up firm 0.48*** 0.61*** 6.69*** 8.56***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.59) (0.64)
Fraction down firm 0.37*** 0.46*** 4.05*** 5.06***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.35) (0.37)
Negative price change
Fraction up industry 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.28
(0.01) (0.02) (0.13) (0.17)
Fraction down industry 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.22)
Fraction up firm 0.27*** 0.34*** 3.85*** 4.76***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.48) (0.51)
Fraction down firm 0.36*** 0.45*** 3.95*** 4.97***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.50) (0.55)
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: "Positive price change" gives the marginal effect on the probability of a positive price change and vice
versa. Marginal effects in percentage points are given by a one percentage point and half a standard deviation change in
the explanatory fraction variables. Standard errors in parantheses. Other control variables include PPI, sector specific
PPI, wage per employee, seasonal and yearly dummies as well as industry dummies at the HS2 level. Marginal effects are
calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean.
Full regression outputs are found in the appendix A3.5. Standard deviations of explanatory variables are found in table
A3.9 in the appendix.
We find a significant relationship between the fraction of both positive and negative
price changes within the firm and the probability of positive and negative price changes.
The marginal effects are significant in both sets of products. However, the marginal
effects seem to be somewhat higher when we consider only the products with frequent
price changes, suggesting a higher degree of within-firm synchronization of price changes
for these products. Somewhat surprisingly, all within-firm marginal effects are positive,
suggesting that an increasing share of positive price changes within the firm also increase
the probability of a negative price change, and vice versa. If the observed synchronization
was solely caused by firm specific shocks we would not expect to see this, as a shock likely
would impact all products within a firm in the same direction. However, in the presence
of economies of scope in menu costs the result seems fully reasonable; a firm can very
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well choose to reduce the price of one product while increasing the price of most other.
These results are qualitatively in line with the findings of Dedola et al. (2019). Bhattarai
and Schoenle (2014) also find that an increase in the within-firm fraction of positive price
changes increase the probability of a positive price change, and vice versa. However, they
do not report the effect of an increase in the fraction of negative changes on the probability
of a positive change, or the effect of an increase in the fraction of positive changes on the
probability of a negative change.
In terms of industry synchronization our results differ qualitatively depending on whether
we use the full sample of products or only those with frequent price changes. If we include
all observations we find a significant positive effect of the fraction of positive changes
in the industry on the probability of a positive change. All other industry variables are
found to be insignificant. For the frequently changing products we also find a negative
marginal effect of the fraction of negative changes on the probability of a positive price
change. This suggest that the probability of increasing prices decreases when the prices of
competing products decrease. As mentioned this marginal effect is not significant when
we use all observations in our model suggesting that there is a difference between the
degree of synchronization in the two groups.
Considering the frequently changing product groups our results are qualitatively similar
to those of Dedola et al. (2019). Our results are also in line with Bhattarai and Schoenle
(2014), but they find significant effects for all reported industry fractions. The marginal
effects of the industry variables are significantly smaller than those of the within-firm
variables implying a quantitatively lower synchronization at the industry level relative to
the firm level. This is in line with the findings of both Dedola et al. (2019) and Bhattarai
and Schoenle (2014).
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5.5.2 Predicted probabilities
Using the estimated marginal effects from the multinomial logit model we plot the
predicted probabilities of the three discrete outcomes using the estimates for the frequently
changing products. The two first plots illustrate the probabilities of the different outcomes
conditional on the fraction of positive and negative price changes within the same firm.
From figure 5.9 we can see that the probability of both a positive and a negative price
change on a given product i increase as the fraction of positive price changes in the firm
increases. The effect is strongest for the probability of a positive change. Conversely, the
probability of not changing the price of product i decreases as the fraction of positive
changes increases. We see the same trends in figure 5.10, the probability of a change
increases with the fraction of negative changes in the firm. Both plots suggest a strong
degree of within-firm synchronization of price changes.
Figure 5.9: Predicted probabilities conditional on the fraction of other positive changes
in firm; within-firm synchronization
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of positive price changes on other products in
the same firm. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their
mean. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only industries categorized as "Frequently changing" are included it the
estimation.
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Figure 5.10: Predicted probabilities conditional on the fraction of other negative changes
in firm; within-firm synchronization
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of negative price changes on other products in
the same firm. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their
mean. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only industries categorized as "Frequently changing" are included it the
estimation.
Turning to price change synchronization within industries, an increasing fraction of upward
changes within the industry increases the probability of increasing the price of product i.
Even though the marginal effect of the fraction of positive price changes in the industry
is significantly different from zero, the effect is still weak in an economic sense as the
effect is small. This can also be seen from figure 5.11 as the predicted probabilities stay
relatively unchanged as the fraction of positive price changes in the industry increases.
The same small effects are found for the fraction of negative changes illustrated in figure
5.12. The overall implications of the predicted probabilities is that there seem to be some
within-industry synchronization of price changes, but this effect is rather small.
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Figure 5.11: Predicted probabilities conditional on the fraction of other positive changes
in industry; within-industry synchronization
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of positive price changes on other products in the
same industry. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean.
Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only "Frequently changing" industries are included it the estimation.
Figure 5.12: Predicted probabilities conditional on the fraction of other negative changes
in industry; within-industry synchronization
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of negative price changes on other products in the
same industry. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean.
Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only "Frequently changing" industries are included it the estimation.
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5.5.3 Marginal effects across bins
To consider whether the synchronization measures vary with the number of products
within-firm, we estimate the multinomial logit model on the bins separately. Table 5.4
presents the marginal effects using +/- 1/2 the standard deviation of the presented
explanatory variables.
Table 5.4: Marginal effects by number of products
Number of products All frequently
changing products1-3 3-5 5-7 >7
Positive price change
Fraction up industry 0.49 0.26 0.43 0.48 0.56*
(0.28) (0.38) (0.25) (0.47) (0.25)
Fraction down industry -0.45 -0.04 0.12 -0.22 -0.48*
(0.30) (0.29) (0.21) (0.55) (0.23)
Fraction up firm 5.29*** 8.23*** 3.66*** 9.63*** 8.56***
(0.93) (1.05) (0.94) (0.78) (0.64)
Fraction down firm 3.21*** 5.17*** 2.22*** 5.46*** 5.06***
(0.54) (0.66) (0.58) (0.49) (0.37)
Negative price change
Fraction up industry -0.09 -0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.28
(0.17) (0.27) (0.11) (0.39) (0.17)
Fraction down industry 0.01 0.18 0.20 0.01 0.09
(0.18) (0.38) (0.15) (0.64) (0.22)
Fraction up firm 2.45*** 5.27*** 1.57*** 5.65*** 4.76***
(0.56) (0.91) (0.45) (0.58) (0.51)
Fraction down firm 2.54*** 5.12*** 1.46*** 6.69*** 4.97***
(0.61) (0.88) (0.42) (0.67) (0.55)
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: "Positive price change" gives the marginal effect on the probability of a positive price change and vice
versa. Marginal effects in percentage points across bins are given by half a standard deviation change in the explanatory
fraction variables. Standard errors in parentheses. Other control variables include PPI, sector specific PPI, wage per
employee, seasonal and yearly dummies as well as industry dummies at the HS2 level. Marginal effects are calculated for
HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean. The marginal
effects are calculated separately for each bin. Full regression outputs are found in the appendix A3.6.Standard deviations
of explanatory variables are found in table A3.9 in the appendix.
From table 5.4, we can see that the generalized effects over the bins are the following:
For the different bins, none of the within-industry marginal effects are significantly different
from zero. As the marginal effects appear similar to those of all frequently changing
products, this might be in part due to fewer observations in the bins relative to the
complete sample. The result indicate that within-industry price change synchronization
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is not all that important in explaining pricing behavior once controlling for shocks and
seasonality. Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) and Dedola et al. (2019) find the industry
synchronization to decrease over the number of products produced by a firm. Conversely,
we do not find any clear trends of synchronization increasing or decreasing with the
number of products. However, the signs of the marginal effects are the same as those
found in both of these papers.
Concerning within-firm price change synchronization, the effects are clear and meaningful
across all bins. Contrary to the research on Danish and US producer pricing behavior
(Dedola et al., 2019; Bhattarai and Schoenle, 2014), we do not find any clear trend
of within-firm synchronization increasing with the number of products. However, the
synchronization appears to be of largest magnitude within the bins 3-5 and >7.
5.5.4 Implications of model choice







Thus, the odds ratio of two outcomes, c and k, is independent on other alternative
outcomes as it only depends on the explanatory variables and parameters associated with
outcomes c and k. This is called the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). In
our case the independence of irrelevant alternatives implicates that if we eliminate the
option of decreasing prices the odds ratio of increasing prices and keeping them unchanged
should stay unchanged. We argue that this is unlikely as the firms who initially would
decrease their prices would prefer keeping them unchanged to increasing them, changing
the odds ratio. Thus, the assumption is likely to be violated.
An alternative to the multinomial logit model is the ordered probit model used in the
papers of Letterie and Nilsen (2020) and Leinum and Riise (2016). The ordered probit
model does not rely on the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, but
it requires the relationship between each pair of outcome groups to be the same. This
assumption is not likely to hold, as firms tend to behave differently when increasing and
decreasing prices (Ball and Mankiw, 1994).
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To assess the implications of model choice we run both models with the same explanatory
variables. A comparison of the marginal effects of the two models can be found in table
A3.7 in the appendix.
The marginal effects of within-industry synchronization are somewhat higher using the
ordered probit model, and all marginal effects are statistically significant. Qualitatively
the results of the ordered probit are similar to those of the multinomial logit, and the
economic significance of the within-industry synchronization is low as the magnitudes of
the marginal effects are low.
As for the within-firm synchronization the results of the ordered probit model differ
substantially from those of the multinomial logit. Both models give positive marginal
effects of an increase in the fraction of positive (negative) changes on the probability of
a positive (negative) price change. The marginal effects of the fractions of the opposite
sign are positive using the multinomial logit model, but negative using the ordered probit.
Thus, the probit model suggest that an increase in the fraction of positive price changes
decreases the probability of a negative price change, and vice versa. The difference between
the results of the two models is illustrated by the predicted probabilities in figure 5.13,
where the probability of a negative price change fall as the fraction of positive price changes
increases using the ordered probit model. The predicted probability plots associated with
changes in the other fractions can be found in figures A3.3-A3.6 in the appendix.
Figure 5.13: Predicted probabilities of other positive changes in firm
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of positive price changes on other products in
the same firm. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean.
Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only "Frequently changing" industries are included in the estimation.
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From these results we can conclude that the choice of model is of high importance. As
discussed the predictions of the multinomial logit model support the theory of economics
of scope in menu costs, as an increase in the fractions of positive and negative price
changes increase the probability of both increasing and decreasing prices. We argue that
the probit model does not give the same clear indication of economics of scope in menu
costs, as an increase in the fractions only increase the probability of a price change of
the same sign. The estimated effects using the probit model might also stem from firm
specific shocks, as a positive firm-specific shock would make it favorable to increase the
prices of all goods in the firm, and vice versa, as predicted by the model. Thus, the results
of the models may have different implications. However, which model is the most correct
is hard to say, as the assumptions of both models seem to be violated in some way. To
make our results comparable to those of Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) and Dedola et al.
(2019) we use a multinomial logit model in our analyses.
5.5.5 Discussion of results: Synchronization behavior
Within-firm synchronization
The results of the multinomial logit model indicate that within-firm price change
synchronization is highly prevalent, and that firms to a large extent synchronize price
changes as a whole rather than the direction of changes. That is, we find the probability
of a negative price change to significantly increase if the fraction of positive changes within
the firm is increasing, and vice versa.
Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) do not report their results in this regard; that is, the
impact of the fraction of positive changes on the probability of a negative price change
and vice versa. We find qualitatively similar results to Dedola et al. (2019), but they find
slightly smaller orders of magnitude regarding the marginal effects. We argue that the
within-firm synchronization can be explained by the theories of menu costs and scope
economies in price changes; changing the price of other products are costless or cheap
once deciding to change price of one good (Midrigan, 2011). Thus, every product will
have its price adjusted in the appropriate direction, as a result of the specific conditions
applied to that product. If the synchronization was caused by solely firm-specific shocks
we would not expect to see the same results, as the shock would impact all products in
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the same direction.
The results of the multinomial logit model differ from those of Letterie and Nilsen (2020)
and Leinum and Riise (2016) using an ordered probit model. They also find strong
evidence of within-firm synchronization of price changes, but find that the probability of
a negative price change fall as the fraction of positive price changes increase, a result that
we argue in part can be explained through firm-specific shocks rather than economics of
scope in menu costs. However, when we employ an ordered probit model on our dataset
we find results similar to those of Letterie and Nilsen (2020) and Leinum and Riise (2016).
This indicates that the model choice is of high importance, but that none of the models
are clearly superior as some assumptions of both seem to be violated.
Contrary to the papers of Bhattarai and Schoenle and Dedola et al., our estimates of
within-firm synchronization do not appear to be related to the number of products within
the firm. One reason could be that there might be systematic differences in the product
offerings of firms in the different bins. If so, this is biasing our results.10 Otherwise, one
could perhaps argue that any multiproduct firm faces the same incentive to synchronize
price changes, regardless of the absolute number of products.
Within-industry synchronization
As for industry synchronization, our results are qualitatively in line with both Bhattarai
and Schoenle (2014) and Dedola et al. (2019). Positive price changes seem to be more
likely when the fraction of positive changes within-industry increase, and less likely when
the fraction of negative changes increase - and vice versa for negative price changes.
Several of these estimates are not significantly different from zero, in contrast to the
studies we compare our results to. Discussing the reasoning for the lack of significance,
two explanations seem plausible: Firstly, the effects appear relatively small, so that
the economic effect might actually be insignificant. However, the order of magnitude
of our industry synchronization appear quite in line with both Bhattarai and Schoenle
and Dedola et al. Secondly, the clearest, obvious difference between our analysis and
these papers lies in the number of observations. Dedola et al.’s paper contains about six
hundred thousand (600 000) observations in all, and well above hundred thousand (100
000) in every bin. Bhattarai and Schoenle do not specify their aggregate number of price
10
See appendix table A3.3 for the distribution of observations within the bins.
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observations, but their bins contain between 2160 firms (bin >7) to 13 577 firms (bin
3-5). Thus, their dataset is likely to be much larger than both Dedola et al.’s and the one
employed in this analysis.
The low and partially insignificant marginal effects give limited evidence of within-
industry synchronization of price changes, suggesting that competitor’s decisions have no
economically significant impact on pricing behavior. This is contrary to what we would
expect in a competitive environment where we expect goods to be strategic complements.
We find three plausible explanations for this:
Firstly, aiming to maximize relevance for the Norwegian economy at a low cost, SSB’s
collection process emphasizes covering large firms where they are dominant (SSB, 2020).
Thus, the dataset does not cover all firms active in a given industry or product group.
An implication of this sampling procedure is that we have have rather few products in
each industry. As shown in figure 4.1 73% of the industries have three or less products on
the HS4 level. A consequence of this is that the industry fractions are highly sensitive
to the actions of one or a few firms, and that the input of the fractions might not be
representative for the industry as a whole. Thus, our dataset might be less suited to
estimate industry synchronization than within-firm synchronization. In addition, smaller
firms with potentially less market power might be more likely to synchronize price changes.
As the dataset contains mostly rather large firms the synchronization of such smaller firms
is not possible to estimate with the data we have. Thus, the overrepresentation of large
firms might bias our results reducing the estimates of within-industry synchronization.
Secondly, our industry classifications might not correctly identify products considered
as strategic complements. The HS4 categorization allows for some difference between
products within the same industry. However, we have examined the model results using
2-digit and 6-digit HS levels. Both levels give results that are qualitatively similar to
the HS4 model, as shown in appendix table A3.8. All marginal effects have the same
signs, and are not significantly different from those at the 4-digit level. In the HS2 model
the industry fraction of positive price changes has a larger effect on the probability of a
positive price change. This marginal effect is significant at the 0.1 percentage level. No
other industry marginal effects in the HS 2-digit model are significant. However, when
using 2-digit HS codes, relatively different products are considered to be competing: For
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instance the dataset contains a lot of machines (HS code 84). These include 4-digit codes
such as 8414 "Air compressors" and 8433 "Mowers and harvesting machinery". Thus, we
argue that the apparent synchronization in the HS 2-digit model is likely to stem, at least
in part, from cost shocks and input prices correlating rather than strategic interaction in
the pricing decisions as the end products are rather different. The model with HS 6-digit
codes is very close to the one using 4-digit codes, but we see no further benefits using this
model: Here, competing products are defined so narrowly that much larger parts of the
products have no competitors compared to the HS 4-digit model.
Thirdly, if our results do not stem from the data being unrepresentative, they indicate
relatively weak competition: If there are few competing substitute products available,
firms may not be that sensitive to changes in the prices of competing products. Grimsby
et al. (2019), examining the development of market concentration in Norway on behalf of
the Norwegian Competition Authority, find a substantially larger market concentration
in Norway compared to the EU and US.11 Domestic market concentration may be less
relevant considering the manufacturing industry as much of it is exposed to international
competition. However, as we have excluded export and import prices as well as products
without domestic prices, we argue that the findings of Grimsby et al. (2019) are of some
relevance to the products covered in this analysis. Thus, the low degree of industry
synchronization may indicate a low degree of access to substitutable products. However,
the argument is relevant for the studies from Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) and Dedola
et al. (2019) as well, as the economic significance of the industry synchronization appears
rather low in all studies. Thus, the low importance of industry synchronization may
indicate that large shares of producers in Norway, as well as abroad, have a degree of
pricing power and are able to disregard competitor behavior to a certain extent.
11
Market concentration is measured using the Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI). The analysis covers
all sectors in the Norwegian economy.
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6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to contribute with micro-evidence on producer pricing
behavior, and evidence on price change synchronization within firms and industries. Such
insights may have important implications for the real effects of monetary policy and can
shed light on the competitive environment in Norwegian product markets. Thus, the
findings presented in this thesis may be relevant for both central banks and competition
authorities.
Pricing behavior is known to be highly heterogenous. To gain an overview of the aggregate
producer pricing behavior, we decompose the aggregate behavior across HS (harmonized
system) product sections. We find relatively low price change frequencies with considerable
heterogeneity across seasons and product groups, suggesting that there is substantial
rigidity in Norwegian producer prices.
Furthermore, we observe several products with rather infrequent price changes, and
another set of products with more frequent changes. Assessing the seasonality tendencies
of these groups, we find excess price change frequency in January and February in both
groups - but this excess price change frequency is far larger in the infrequently changing
product groups, pointing toward the prevalence of explicit contracts with a one-year
duration (Alvarez et al., 2006).
Traditional macroeconomic models assume firms to be single product entities. A new
wave of studies have challenged this assumption, showing that multiproduct firms are
largely prevalent and, importantly, that multiproduct firms tend to behave differently
from single product firms. We document that the mean size of changes tend to decrease
with the number of products within a firm, and that the fraction of small changes tend to
increase in the number of products. This suggest that the number of products produced
by a firm has an impact on pricing behavior.
Several studies have documented the prevalence of within-firm synchronization of price
changes (Midrigan, 2011; Bhattarai and Schoenle, 2014; Yang, 2019; Dedola et al., 2019;
Letterie and Nilsen, 2020; Bonomo et al., 2020). Examining the pricing behavior on the
extensive margin, using a multinomial logit model, we document a high degree of within-
firm synchronization of price changes. Furthermore, we find the synchronization to be
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largely independent of the direction of changes. We argue that this finding mainly support
the theory of scope economies in menu costs rather than firm- or sector-specific shocks,
as such shocks are likely to impact all products in the same direction. As emphasized
in literature, within-firm synchronization reduces the responsiveness of a single product
price to shocks, as the pricing decision depend on the benefits of changing other prices
as well. Thus, economics of scope in menu costs increase the price rigidity (Midrigan,
2011). We find the synchronization effects to be economically significant and they should
therefore be accounted for in macroeconomic models - who traditionally model firms as
single product entities.
Bhaskar (2002) argues that synchronization of price changes due to strategic
complementarity is more prevalent between products with a high degree of substitutability,
and thus it should be more prevalent within industries than across industries. Motivated
by the findings of Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) and Dedola et al. (2019), we examine the
synchronization within 4-digit HS product groups, under the assumption that products
within a group are relatively substitutable. We document industry synchronization to be
prevalent, and the results point toward strategic complementarity in pricing decisions:
If product prices in the industry are changing upward (downward), the probability of
an upward (downward) change increases. These results are comparable to those of
Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) and Dedola et al. (2019). However, in economic terms, the
synchronization appears to be of minor importance in explaining pricing behavior at the
aggregate level as the synchronization effects are rather low.
To the extent that these results are not biased by the prevalence of large firms in our
data, we argue that they serve as an indicator of relatively weak competition. If there
are few competing substitute products available, firms may not be that sensitive to
changes in the prices of competing products. Grimsby et al. (2019), on behalf on the
Norwegian Competition Authority, found the aggregate market concentration in Norway to
be substantially larger than in the EU and US. Assuming that this holds when considering
only the manufacturing industry, it can explain and underpin this result: The low economic
significance of industry synchronization may indicate that large fractions of Norwegian
firms have pricing power and are able to disregard competitor behavior to a certain extent.
This has important implications for the efficiency of the markets covered in our analysis.
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Such pricing power allows producers to increase their margins, reducing the efficiency of
the markets and redistributing wealth from consumers to producers.
Regarding implications for the price rigidity, Ball and Romer (1991) argue that even a
small degree of strategic complementarity may increase the price rigidity as it amplifies
the impact of nominal rigidities such as menu costs. Thus, our findings related to
within-industry synchronization may have implications for price rigidity, even though the
synchronization effects are small. However, the magnitude of impact on the price rigidity
is unknown and estimating it is beyond the scope of our analysis.
While our results support previous research regarding within-firm synchronization of price
changes, the paper is among the first to apply PPI data to examine synchronization
of price changes on the industry level. Although our results indicate low within-
industry synchronization at the aggregate level, the result may be different considering
specific industries. A limitation of the PPI dataset is that the true number of actors
within an industry is unknown. If the detailed pricing data is combined with data
on market concentration and the degree of exposure to international competition, an
interesting avenue of future research could be to examine whether industry price change
synchronization changes with these characteristics.
Regarding the limitations of our study the main consideration is that we, in many
industries, observe relatively few competitors. This may not reflect reality, as we are
aware that the sampling procedure of PPI data induces a bias toward large firms. As
such, further research and considerations are required to assess the generalizability of our
findings.
Overall, we find evidence of substantial price rigidity, which in part can be explained by
scope economics in menu costs. Strategic complementarity within industries might also
play a role in amplifying these rigidities. Combined with earlier literature these findings
have important implications for the micro foundations of macroeconomic models and
policy. However, further research is still needed to fully understand the multiproduct and
synchronization dimensions of pricing behavior. Our findings also indicate that producers
have a degree of pricing power, a finding that is relevant for both competition authorities
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Table A1.1: HS sections, full names
Section Section name
1 Live animals; animal products
2 Vegetable products
3 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible
fats; animal or vegetable waxes
4 Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits and vinegar; tobacco and
manufactured tobacco substitutes
5 Mineral products
6 Products of the chemical or allied industries
7 Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof
8 Raw hides and skins, leather, fur, skins and articles thereof; saddlery and
harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut
(other than silk-worm gut)
9 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; cork and articles of cork;
manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basket ware
and wickerwork
10 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and
scrap) paper or paperboard; paper and paperboard and articles thereof
11 Textiles and textile articles
12 Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks,
whips, riding-crops and parts thereof; prepared feathers and articles made
therewith; artificial flowers; articles of human hair
13 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials; ceramic
products; glass and glassware
14 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals,
metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin
15 Base metals and articles of base metal
16 Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; parts thereof;
sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and
reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles
17 Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment
18 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision,
medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; clocks and watches; musical
instruments; parts and accessories thereof
19 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof
20 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
21 Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques
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Table A1.2: Size of firms in price data relative to the average Norwegian firm
SIC07 Number of employees Number of firms per enterprise









10 20.64 119.78 1.14 4.25 1.15
11 31.93 161.38 1.15 3.81 1.02
13 5.57 46.73 1.04 2.01 1.00
14 2.28 44.08 1.00 1.00 1.00
15 4.37 23.93 1.00 1.00 1.00
16 8.37 85.10 1.04 1.97 1.05
17 52.15 165.57 1.11 1.59 1.05
18 5.66 26.88 1.02 1.00 1.00
20 36.51 118.20 1.20 2.11 1.00
21 68.88 209.84 1.14 2.02 1.00
22 12.54 60.37 1.06 1.53 1.00
23 12.12 63.82 1.24 4.39 1.14
24 68.54 259.41 1.13 1.76 1.13
25 10.63 61.75 1.03 1.93 1.00
26 27.02 126.19 1.07 1.36 1.00
27 18.62 145.24 1.08 2.57 1.08
28 15.76 114.29 1.06 1.54 1.01
29 26.63 44.25 1.13 1.64 1.00
30 43.96 35.67 1.11 4.95 1.08
31 7.93 74.14 1.01 1.18 1.00
32 4.28 63.65 1.02 1.14 1.00
33 9.66 194.65 1.06 9.43 1.00
Note: For the number of employees "All firms" give the mean number of employees for all firms included in the firm
structure dataset. First we find the average number of employees per firm over the period 2005-2016. The yearly averages
are used to calculate the SIC average. The "Firms in dataset" column gives the mean number of employees using only the
firms represented in the PPI dataset.
The mean number of firms per enterprise is calculated in the same way as the mean number of employees. The
"All firms" column gives the mean number of firms per enterprise for all firms included in the firm structure dataset.
"Enterprises represented in dataset" gives the same statistic for firms represented in the PPI dataset. "Firms per enterprise
in dataset" gives the mean number of firms per enterprise in the PPI dataset. This means that on average the enterprises
with SIC 10 represented in the dataset have 4.25 firms. However, in the PPI data they are on average represented with
only 1.15 firms. Only observations after 2010 are included in the enterprise calculations as we do not have data on the
firm-enterprise structure prior to 2011.
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Figure A2.1: Number of firms per HS code
The mean number of firms per HS code is calculated by first finding the distinct number of firms producing products with
a given HS code in a given year. The yearly numbers are used to find a mean number of firms represented in each code.
This mean is then rounded to the closest integer. Furthermore, we find the number of HS codes with on average one firm
represented in the sample etc. This number is divided by the total number of distinct HS codes in our dataset to find the
share of HS codes with a given number of firms.
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Products Firms Products Firms Products Firms
1 1 85.8 12 5 .7 22 7 .6
2 1 28 12 8 .5 22 8 .1
2 2 13.6 13 1 .3 23 4 .3
3 1 21.1 13 2 1.8 23 8 .2
3 2 9.6 13 3 .3 23 9 .3
3 3 3.1 13 4 .8 23 10 .2
4 1 5.5 13 5 .3 24 5 .3
4 2 4.9 13 6 .2 24 9 .1
4 3 .2 13 7 .2 25 5 .3
4 4 .3 13 8 .3 25 6 .2
5 1 5.3 14 2 .1 25 7 .3
5 2 6.7 14 3 .3 25 10 .2
5 3 1.7 14 5 .3 26 4 .2
5 4 .5 14 6 .5 26 5 .3
5 5 .2 14 7 .6 26 6 .1
6 1 4.3 14 8 .3 26 7 .2
6 2 5.4 15 2 .1 26 11 .2
6 3 5.5 15 3 .1 27 4 .1
7 1 3.1 15 4 .8 27 6 .3
7 2 2.9 15 5 .7 27 8 .1
7 3 2.5 15 6 .8 28 5 .2
7 4 .9 15 7 .2 28 7 .6
7 5 .2 15 8 .3 28 8 .1
8 1 1.1 15 9 .2 29 7 .1
8 2 4.3 16 2 .1 29 8 .3
8 3 1.8 16 3 .3 29 11 .1
8 4 .8 16 4 1 30 7 .1
8 5 .8 16 5 .5 30 8 .1
8 6 .8 16 6 .3 30 9 .1
9 1 .7 17 2 .1 31 8 .1
9 2 1.2 17 4 .3 31 9 .1
9 3 2.4 17 5 .3 32 8 .3
9 4 .3 17 6 .7 32 9 .1
9 5 .4 17 10 .1 33 9 .2
9 6 .7 18 2 .1 33 10 .3
9 7 .1 18 3 .3 34 9 .5
10 1 1.2 18 4 .8 35 9 .3
10 2 .8 18 5 .8 35 10 .2
10 3 1.6 18 7 .4 35 11 .1
10 4 1.6 19 2 .3 36 10 .1
10 5 .4 19 3 .1 36 11 .1
10 7 .1 19 4 .2 37 10 .2
10 8 .1 19 5 .3 38 11 .1
11 2 4.6 19 7 .3 42 9 .1
11 3 2.9 19 12 .2 43 10 .1
11 4 .6 20 3 .3 49 16 .1
11 5 .6 20 4 .2 51 17 .3
11 6 .2 20 7 .2 55 17 .1
11 7 .4 20 13 .1 56 15 .1
11 8 .4 21 4 .2 56 16 .1
12 1 .2 21 5 .1 56 17 .2
12 2 1.8 21 8 .3 58 16 .1
12 3 1.7 21 9 .1 58 17 .1
12 4 .8 22 4 .2
Note: The table gives the yearly average number of HS4 codes with a given number of firms and products. For example,
there are on average 9.6 HS4 codes in the dataset that are represented with three product produced by two different firms.
To calculate the averages we first find all combinations of number of firms and number of products in a given year as well
as the frequency of this combination. The average number of HS4 codes is given by the mean of these yearly frequencies.
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Figure A3.1: Cumulative distribution of share of price changes per year
Note: The graph shows the cumulative distribution of the mean share of price changes per product in the two behavioural
categories. First we calculate the yearly share of price changes for each product. Based on these yearly shares we find the
mean share of price changes per year for each product.
Figure A3.1 shows the cumulative distribution of the mean share of price changes per year
for the industries categorized as infrequently and frequently changing. As the products
are categorized based on the industry level share of price changes per year some products
with few changes per year will be categorized as frequently changing an opposite. From
the figure we can see that about 85% of the products categorized as infrequently changing
change on average less than one time per year. The corresponding measure for the
frequently changing products is about 30%.
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Figure A3.2: Mean size of positive and negative price changes over bins
Note: To find the mean size of positive and negative price changes in each bin we first calculate the mean size of positive
and negative price changes at the product level. Next, we find the median sizes across all products in each firm. The bin
level means are given by the average of these median sizes. The dashed lines represent the 95% CI. They are given by +/-
1.96 times the standard error across firms.
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Figure A3.3: Predicted probabilities conditional on the fraction of other positive changes
in firm , ordered probit
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of positive price changes on other products in
the same firm. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their
mean. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only industries categorized as "Frequently changing" are included it the
estimation.
Figure A3.4: Predicted probabilities conditional on the fraction of other negative changes
in firm, ordered probit
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of negative price changes on other products in
the same firm. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their
mean.Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only industries categorized as "Frequently changing" are included it the
estimation.
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Figure A3.5: Predicted probabilities conditional on the fraction of other positive changes
in industry, ordered probit
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of positive price changes on other products in the
same industry. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their
mean.Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only industries categorized as "Frequently changing" are included it the
estimation.
Figure A3.6: Predicted probabilities conditional on the fraction of other negative changes
in industry, ordered probit
Note: Predicted probabilities of discrete pricing decision over the fraction of negative price changes on other products in the
same industry. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted probability. Predicted probabilities
are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their
mean.Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Only industries categorized as "Frequently changing" are included it the
estimation.
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1 14.70 58.98 4.08% 41.18 29.41
2 3.99 16.97 1.17% 20.30 10.53
3 2.37 7.53 0.52% 32.99 11.89
4 41.88 243.66 16.84% 34.50 16.08
5 9.24 23.26 1.61% 26.86 10.17
6 33.10 133.00 9.19% 25.34 7.63
7 23.36 83.14 5.74% 28.19 8.39
8 2.51 11.84 0.82% 6.38 3.50
9 35.18 126.52 8.74% 34.61 15.79
10 14.68 45.48 3.14% 29.20 12.90
11 17.06 67.11 4.64% 12.15 6.29
12 1.88 4.60 0.13% 2.30 0.00
13 22.15 89.24 6.17% 21.97 8.42
14 4.33 12.33 0.85% 15.50 8.39
15 41.42 155.58 10.75% 22.57 7.37
16 54.74 219.31 15.15% 12.21 6.99
17 5.63 29.15 2.01% 11.51 10.87
18 7.00 34.56 2.39% 17.23 6.29
20 22.63 87.58 6.05% 24.65 9.09
Note: Number of firms and products give the mean number of firms and products in the section. Share of dataset gives
the share of the total price quotes. Price change frequencies are first calculated on the product level as the number of
price changes over the number of observations for a given product. Section mean and median gives the mean and median
frequencies of the products within a section. Frequencies are estimated as percentages.










Non-durables, food 53.42 277.08 19.43% 34.16
Non-durables, non-food 12.50 34.00 2.37% 33.82
Durables 55.17 198.08 13.90% 15.77
Intermediate goods 229.58 742.00 52.13% 26.00
Capital goods 44.75 172.08 12.17% 10.47
Note: Number of firms and products are mean values calculated as the average number of products and firms per year. Price
change frequency is given by the number of price changes over the number of observations in each category. Frequencies











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Constant 0.494*** 0.017 0.465***
(0.101) (0.013) (0.062)
Bin 1-3 0.036 0.010* -0.076**
(0.039) (0.005) (0.024)
Bin 3-5 0.026 0.006 -0.052*
(0.043) (0.005) (0.027)
Bin 5-7 0.011 0.005 -0.007
(0.047) (0.006) (0.029)
Bin >7 Omitted Omitted Omitted
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: The multiproduct measures are regressed on the explanatory multiproduct bins, as well as HS 2-digit
product groups to eliminate the variation potentially explained by different weights in product groups. The number of
employees is included as a proxy to control for firm size.
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Table A3.5: Multinomial logit, marginal effects
All observations Products withfrequent changes
Positive price change
Fraction up industry 0.06*** 0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
Fraction down industry -0.02 -0.05*
(0.02) (0.03)
Fraction up firm 0.48*** 0.61***
(0.04) (0.05)
Fraction down firm 0.37*** 0.46***
(0.03) (0.03)
Sector specific PPI 0.00*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
log(wage per employee) 0.03*** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
Negative price change
Fraction up industry 0.00 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
Fraction down industry 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Fraction up firm 0.27*** 0.34***
(0.03) (0.04)
Fraction down firm 0.36*** 0.45***
(0.05) (0.05)
Sector specific PPI 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
log(wage per employee) 0.03*** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01)
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: "Positive price change" gives the marginal effect on the probability of a positive price change and vice
versa. Marginal effects in percentage points are given by a one percentage point change in the explanatory variables.
Other control variables include yearly, monthly and HS2 dummies. Marginal effects are calculated for HS2 category 36
"Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A3.6: Multinomial logit over bins, marginal effects
Number of products
1-3 3-5 5-7 >7
Positive price change
Fraction up industry 0.062* 0.020 0.035* 0.024
(0.031) (0.030) (0.017) (0.026)
Fraction down industry -0.069 -0.003 0.012 -0.013
(0.043) (0.030) (0.020) (0.036)
Fraction up firm 0.501*** 0.524*** 0.232*** 0.394***
(0.047) (0.039) (0.029) (0.031)
Fraction down firm 0.382*** 0.433*** 0.181*** 0.302***
(0.043) (0.037) (0.027) (0.024)
Sector specific PPI 0.009*** 0.005** 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(wage per employee) 0.064* 0.044* 0.003 0.012
(0.031) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007)
Negative price change
Fraction up industry -0.013 -0.004 0.001 -0.001
(0.020) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014)
Fraction down industry 0.004 0.011 0.017 0.000
(0.025) (0.024) (0.012) (0.027)
Fraction up firm 0.206*** 0.222*** 0.089*** 0.162***
(0.032) (0.026) (0.014) (0.018)
Fraction down firm 0.288*** 0.274*** 0.106*** 0.234***
(0.040) (0.029) (0.017) (0.026)
Sector specific PPI -0.005*** -0.003* 0.000 -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
log(wage per employee) 0.051* 0.035** 0.004 0.011
(0.022) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007)
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: "Positive price change" gives the marginal effect on the probability of a positive price change and vice
versa. Marginal effects in percentage points are given by a one percentage point change in the explanatory variables.
Other control variables include yearly, monthly and HS2 dummies. Marginal effects are calculated for HS2 category 36
"Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A3.7: Multinomial logit model and ordered probit model, marginal effects
Multinomial logit Ordered probit
Positive price change
Fraction up industry 0.05* 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02)
Fraction down industry -0.05* -0.06***
(0.03) (0.02)
Fraction up firm 0.61*** 0.29***
(0.05) (0.02)
Fraction down firm 0.46*** -0.20***
(0.03) (0.02)
Sector specific PPI 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
log(wage per employee) 0.03** -0.01
(0.01) (0.00)
Negative price change
Fraction up industry -0.03 -0.06***
(0.02) (0.01)
Fraction down industry 0.01 0.05***
(0.02) (0.01)
Fraction up firm 0.34*** -0.22***
(0.04) (0.01)
Fraction down firm 0.45*** 0.15***
(0.05) (0.02)
Sector specific PPI 0.00*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
log(wage per employee) 0.04** 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: "Positive price change" gives the marginal effect on the probability of a positive price change and vice
versa. Marginal effects in percentage points are given by a one percentage point change in the explanatory variables.
Other control variables include yearly, monthly and HS2 dummies. Marginal effects are calculated for HS2 category 36
"Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean. Standard errors in parentheses.
Only "frequently changing" industries are used in the estimation.
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Table A3.8: Multinomial logit with different levels of industry aggregation, marginal
effects
Level of industry aggregation
HS2 HS4 HS6
Positive price change
Fraction up industry 0.12*** 0.05* 0.05**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Fraction down industry -0.06 -0.05* -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Fraction up firm 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.60***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Fraction down firm 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.45***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Sector specific PPI 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(wage per employee) 0.04** 0.03** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Negative price change
Fraction up industry -0.04 -0.03 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Fraction down industry 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Fraction up firm 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.33***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Fraction down firm 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.45***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Sector specific PPI 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(wage per employee) 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: "Positive price change" gives the marginal effect on the probability of a positive price change and vice
versa. Marginal effects in percentage points are given by a one percentage point change in the explanatory variables.
Other control variables include yearly, monthly and HS2 dummies. Marginal effects are calculated for HS2 category 36
"Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other variables are held at their mean. Standard errors in parentheses.
Only "frequently changing" industries are used in the estimation.
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Table A3.9: Standard deviations of explanatory variables
Variable 1/2 standard deviation
Fraction up industry 10.95
Fraction down industry 8.97
Fraction up firm 14.07
Fraction down firm 10.95
Note: All standard deviations are in percentage points
